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I n the plurality decision of Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 
1941 (1996), the Supreme Court of 
the United States held that three 
Texas congressional districts vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment 
due to racial gerrymandering. In 
applying the precedent of Miller v. 
Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995), 
the Court found the use of highly 
detailed racial data and abandon-
ment of traditional redistricting 
principles, coupled with a commit-
ment to create majority-minority 
districts, required the application 
of strict scrutiny. Further, the 
Court found that the bizarre district 
boundaries were the result of racial 
and not political manipulation, and 
thus were unconstitutional. 
The 1990 national census re-
vealed that an urban population 
increase entitled Texas to an addi-
tional three seats in the House of 
Representatives. In attempting to 
comply with the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq., 
the Texas Legislature created two 
new districts and reconfigured 
another district. District Twenty-
Nine became a majority Hispanic 
district and Districts Eighteen and 
Thirty were drawn to be majority 
African-American districts. The 
United States Department of Jus-
tice approved the plan and Texas 
employed it in the 1992 congres-
sional elections. 
The respondents, six Texas 
citizens residing in the reconfig-
ured districts, filed suit, claiming 
that twenty-four of the thirty Texas 
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congressional districts were ra-
cially gerrymandered in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas 
held that Districts Eighteen, 
Twenty-Nine, and Thirty were 
unconstitutional. The district court 
found the Texas Legislature at the 
outset strove to create majority-
minority districts. In addition, the 
district court found that the use of 
sophisticated redistricting software 
to refine political boundaries using 
racial demographics resulted in a 
violation of equal protectiqn. The 
Supreme Court of the United 
States granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether the racial classifica-
tions embodied in the challenged 
districts were narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest. 
In beginning its analysis, the 
Court determined whether the re-
spondents had been subjected to 
any racial classification and there-
fore had standing to seek relief. 
Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1951 (citing 
United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 
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2431, 2436 (1995)(plaintiff resid-
ing in racially gerrymandered dis-
trict was denied equal protection 
by state legislature)). Applying 
the Hays rationale, the Court found 
that the Respondents had standing 
to challenge Districts Eighteen, 
Twenty-Nine, and Thirty. ld. 
Next, the Court examined its 
criteria for establishing whether an 
election district is subject to strict 
scrutiny. The Court noted that 
strict scrutiny applies to redistrict-
ing legislation that is so irregular 
that segregation of the races for 
voting purposes is the only rational 
conclusion. !d. at 1951 (citing 
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,642 
(1995)). The Court also recog-
nized that strict scrutiny applies 
when race '''was the legislature's 
dominant and controlling rationale 
in drawing its district lines. '" ld. 
(quoting Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. 
Ct. 2475, 2486 (1995)). Finally, 
the Court acknowledged that strict 
scrutiny does not automatically 
apply to intentionally created 
majority-minority districts. ld. 
(citing DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. 
Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994), sum-
marily aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2637 
(1995)). 
The Governor of Texas, the 
United States, and private interve-
nors, as petitioners, argued that the 
Texas Legislature's goals included 
incumbency protection, in addition 
to creating majority-minority dis-
tricts. !d. The Court, however, 
upheld the district court's finding 
that the "districts at issue 'have no 
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 25 
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integrity in terms of traditional, 
neutral redistricting criteria. '" Id. 
(quoting Vera v. Richards, 861 F. 
Supp. 1304, 1339 (S.D. Tx. 
1994)). The Court also agreed 
with the district court that direct 
evidence of intent to create 
majority-minority districts and the 
use of a computer mapping pro-
gram to create block-by-block 
districts further supported the 
claim of racial gerrymandering. 
Id. at 1953. The Court opined that 
these findings weighed in favor of 
application of strict scrutiny, and 
that each of the three districts must 
be scrutinized to determine if race 
was the predominate factor in re-
districting decisions. Id. at 1953-
54. 
In examining District Thirty, 
petitioners claimed that the bound-
aries had been drawn to "unite 
communities of interest in a single 
district and ... to protect incum-
bents." Id. at 1955. While ac-
knowledging that a State is free to 
use certain data to effect political 
gerrymandering, the Court held 
that when a racial proxy is substi-
tuted for political characteristics, 
the application of strict scrutiny is 
required. Id. at 1956. The Court 
noted that, despite the correlation 
between race and political associa-
tion, the district maps revealed 
"that political considerations were 
subordinated to racial classifica-
tions." Id. at 1957. Finding that 
race had been used as a proxy to 
protect incumbency and to in-
crease minority population within 
District Thirty, the Court con-
cluded that District Thirty was 
subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 
27.1 U. Balt. L.F. 26 
1958. 
Turning its attention to Dis-
tricts Eighteen and Twenty-Nine, 
the Court noted the districts were 
inexplicably intertwined .. Id. In 
affirming the district court's find-
ing of "utter disregard for tradi-
tional redistricting criteria," the 
Court opined that the boundaries 
were based upon racial quotas. Id. 
at 1959-60. Accordingly, the 
Court upheld the district court's 
finding that the district boundaries 
were subject to strict scrutiny. Id. 
at 1960. 
Next, the Court examined 
whether the racial classifications 
embodied in the district boundaries 
were narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest. Id. Peti-
tioners claimed that they were 
complying with § 2(a) of the Vot-
ing Rights Act, which states that a 
violation exists if the political pro-
cesses for nomination and election 
are not equally open to minority 
participation. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973(b )). In refuting this claim, 
the Court held that a State may not 
"subordinate traditional districting 
principles to race" to escape § 2(a) 
liability. Id. at 1961. In addition, 
the Court held that because the 
district's bizarre shapes were dic-
tated by racial and not political 
considerations, any claim that they 
were narrowly tailored to avoid § 
2(a) liability must be precluded. 
!d. at 1962. 
Petitioners next argued that 
Texas had a compelling interest in 
remedying past and present racial 
discrimination. ld. The Court 
noted that two conditions must be 
satisfied for Texas' interest in rem-
edying discrimination to be com-
pelling: (1) the discrimination 
must be identifiable, and (2) the 
State must have a strong eviden-
tiary reason to conclude that reme-
dial action is necessary. Id. at 
1962-63. While acknowledging 
that petitioners were attempting to 
remedy the problem of vote dilu-
tion, the Court held that this situa-
tion did "not justify race-based 
districting unless 'the State em-
ploy[ s] sound districting 
principles. '" Id. at 1963 (quoting 
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657). 
The petitioners finally argued 
that the State had a compelling 
interest in complying with § 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act. Id. The 
Court discounted this argument, 
stating that the aim of § 5 is to 
prohibit the retrogression of mi-
norities in exercising their voting 
franchise. Id. The Court held that 
retrogression avoidance does not 
grant a State freedom to act in any 
manner necessary to continue mi-
nority electoral success. Id. Thus, 
the Court found that District Eight-
een "is not narrowly tailored to the 
avoidance of § 5 liability." Id. 
In a dissent joined by Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer, Justice 
Stevens argued that the majority 
had incorrectly implemented its 
own racial gerrymandering tests. 
Id. at 1974. Justice Stevens be-
lieved that because the districts 
were the result of Texas' attempt 
to comply with the Voting Rights 
Act, the redistricting plan satisfied 
strict scrutiny. Id. at 1975. Justice 
Stevens noted that a proper reading 
of the record would result in the 
conclusion that the intentional 
race-conscious design, protection 
of incumbency, and communities 
of interest considerations would 
override any suggestion that race 
dominated the redistricting. Id. at 
1980. 
In a separate dissent joined by 
Justices Ginsberg and Breyer, 
Justice Souter stated that the Court 
should outline the specific ele-
ments necessary to identify an 
injury distinguishable from proper 
constitutional conduct. Id. at 
1997. In addition, Justice Souter 
argued that the Court's failure to 
fashion districting criteria inclu-
sive of racial considerations would 
result in the Court having over-





The ramifications to Maryland 
congressional districts if chal-
lenged on the basis of Bush v. Vera 
would be felt throughout the 
Baltimore-Washington metropoli-
tan region. As a result of redis-
tricting in 1991, minority popula-
tion in Maryland's Second, Third 
and Fifth Districts diminished, 
while it greatly increased in the 
Seventh District and the newly-
created Fourth District. Barry 
Rascovar, Racial Redistricting Is A 
Goner. Good Riddance!, BaIt. Sun, 
June 30, 1996, at E3. While 
Maryland's districts are not the 
result of bizarre boundary aberra-
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tions similar to the Texas districts, 
they do display the racial gerry-
mandering characteristics at issue 
in Bush. A new challenge under 
Bush could possibly succeed. 
Editor's Note: Prior to Bush v. 
Vera, the Representatives for 
Texas Congressional Districts 
Eighteen, Twenty-Nine, and Thirty 
were Sheila Jackson Lee, Gene 
Green, and Eddie Bernice Johnson. 
Subsequent to redistricting that 
resulted from Bush, Repre-
sentatives Lee and Johnson won 
reelection in their redrawn districts 
10 the 1996 Congressional 
elections. 
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